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Mark ở vũ trụ khác · Another Universe Famous experiments · Cognitive psychology

The Anchoring Wheel

10 → 25% 65 → 45%

Anchoring · Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Science, 1974

WhoAmos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
When1974 paper · replicated and extended to this day
Sizelarge replication: 6,344 people in 36 samples (Klein et al., 2014)
Verdictreal effect, replicates well · robustness 8 / 10
Reread in 1 minute

Essence

A meaningless number still pullsWheel stops at 10: people guess 25%. Stops at 65: they guess 45% (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Replicates very wellRedone with 6,344 people in 36 samples, anchoring was still clear (Klein et al., 2014).
First offer pulls the dealAcross 90 studies: correlation of 0.62 between first offer and final price (Petrowsky et al., 2025).
Unhook by doingThink of your own target and reasons the number is wrong; just "knowing" is not enough.
Careful with random numbersPrice anchoring is moderate, smaller than in early papers; random anchors pull less (Li et al., 2021).
Part 1

The question

When we estimate a number, does the number we just saw drag us along, even when we know it means nothing? The answer after 50 years: yes, quite reliably. And at the negotiating table, the first number often wins.

1974The experimentA wheel showing 10 or 65 shifts answers by 20 percentage points.
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1987–2001Real lifeEstate agents, judges and negotiators are all pulled.
→
2014–2025Re-checkedReplicated in 36 samples. Only purely random anchors are weaker than the story.
Part 2

How the experiment worked

A wheel numbered 0 to 100, spun in front of participants, then two questions.

A wheel numbered 0 to 100, rigged to stop only at 10 or 65. Question 1: is the share of African countries in the United Nations higher or lower than that number? Question 2: estimate the exact share. Those who saw 10 gave a median of 25 percent; those who saw 65 gave 45 percent. stops only at 10 or 65 Q1: higher or lower than this number? Q2: what % of UN members are African? saw 10 → said 25% saw 65 → said 45% median answers · Tversky and Kahneman, Science, 1974
Everyone could see the number was random. It still pulled the answers. The paper also notes that paying for accuracy did not reduce the effect.
Part 1

The wheel and the number 65

10 or 655-second multiplicationwhy it got famous
Part 2

Who names the number first?

mechanismfirst offersunhooking
Part 3

Re-checked

Many Labsrandom anchorsapply
Part 3

Key concepts

Anchoring and insufficient adjustment

anchoring and adjustmentTversky and Kahneman, 1974
A number line from 0 to 100. From the anchor 10, people move up and stop at 25. From the anchor 65, people move down and stop at 45. The two groups stop in different places, each close to its own anchor. 050100 anchor 10 anchor 65 stops at 25 stops at 45 Start from the given number, move away step by step, stop too soon.
This is Tversky and Kahneman's original explanation. Epley and Gilovich (2006) showed insufficient adjustment is especially clear when people generate the anchor themselves, for example starting from a number they already know.

Searching for reasons that fit

selective accessibilityMussweiler and Strack, 1999

The comparison question

"Is it higher than 65?" To answer, the mind tries out "maybe it is 65".

Selected evidence

We first recall things that fit that number. They are ready at hand when we estimate.

The antidote

Actively think of reasons the number might be wrong. This reduces anchoring (Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer, 2000).

The two explanations do not exclude each other. Both pull the answer toward the anchor.

Multiplying in 5 seconds

8×7×6×5×4×3×2×1Tversky and Kahneman, 1974
High-school students had 5 seconds to estimate the product of eight numbers. Those who saw the ascending sequence from 1 gave a median of 512. Those who saw the descending sequence from 8 gave a median of 2,250. The correct answer is 40,320. 1×2×3×…×8 512 8×7×6×…×1 2,250 correct answer 40,320 median estimates · high-school students · 5 seconds · bars drawn to scale
The first few steps anchor the whole sum. Starting with large numbers gave bigger estimates, but both groups guessed far too low.

The first offer in a negotiation

first-offer effectGalinsky and Mussweiler, 2001 · Petrowsky et al., 2025
Meta-analysis of 90 studies, 16,334 people: the correlation between first offer and final agreement is 0.62. An ambitious first offer gets a better price, but makes impasses more likely and leaves the recipient less satisfied. 0.62 correlation, firstoffer and final price 90 studies · 16,334 people + ambitious first offer better price when a deal is made − the cost fewer deals less satisfied recipient (anger, per the authors) Petrowsky et al., Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2025
Whoever makes the first offer usually gains, buyer or seller. Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) found this in all 3 experiments, face to face and by email. The advantage shrinks when many issues are negotiated at once (Petrowsky et al., 2025).

Plausible numbers and random numbers

incidental vs plausible anchorsManiadis 2014 · Li 2021

The shocking original

Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003): the last two digits of a social security number pulled what MBA students were willing to pay.

Weaker on replication

Fudenberg, Levine and Maniadis (2012) redid it in the lab: very weak anchoring for goods, none for lotteries. Maniadis, Tufano and List (2014) redid Ariely's unpleasant-sounds experiment: weaker and not statistically significant.

53 studies pooled

Li, Maniadis and Sedikides (2021): price anchoring is moderate, smaller than in early studies; non-random anchors pull harder.

At the negotiating table, numbers always look relevant. That is why anchoring there stays strong.

Part 4

Evidence check: how far to trust it

10 common claims about anchoring, checked against current research. Click a row to see why.

SOLIDA number shown first pulls estimates toward it

The original experiment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and hundreds of studies since. Many Labs (Klein et al., 2014) redid four anchoring questions in 36 samples: all four replicated, among the clearest effects of the project.

SOLIDThe effect holds across countries, in the lab and online

Many Labs had 6,344 people. The authors found that setting (lab or online, US or elsewhere) mostly did not change effect size. Note: Many Labs used fixed anchors in comparison questions, not a wheel.

SOLIDPaying for accuracy or warning people does not remove the anchor

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) report that paying for accuracy did not reduce the effect. Wilson et al. (1996) found that neither an incentive nor detailed warnings about anchoring made the effect smaller.

SOLIDExperts are pulled too

Estate agents' valuations followed the listing price they were given (Northcraft and Neale, 1987). Experienced judges were pulled by a number from dice when proposing a sentence (Englich, Mussweiler and Strack, 2006). Individual samples are not large, but many studies point the same way.

SOLIDWhoever makes the first offer usually gains

Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001), 3 experiments. A meta-analysis of 90 studies, 16,334 people (Petrowsky et al., 2025): there is a first-mover advantage, and first-offer level correlates 0.62 with the final price. Two preregistered experiments with 2,121 people replicated this.

CAUTIOUSPurely random numbers pull as hard as plausible ones

Ariely et al. (2003) results were much weaker on replication: very weak anchoring for goods, none for lotteries (Fudenberg, Levine and Maniadis, 2012); the unpleasant-sounds experiment gave a weak, non-significant effect (Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014). A meta-analysis of 53 price studies (Li, Maniadis and Sedikides, 2021): non-random anchors pull harder.

CAUTIOUSThe higher the first offer, the better

Petrowsky et al. (2025): ambitious first offers give better final prices, but mean fewer deals and less satisfied recipients. The advantage depends on the deal happening at all.

CAUTIOUSThe first-offer advantage holds in every negotiation

In the same meta-analysis, first-offer effects shrink when many issues are negotiated at once. If you lack market information, going first can anchor yourself low; this is a rule of thumb from the Harvard Program on Negotiation, not a measured number.

CAUTIOUSPrecise numbers (1,865) pull harder than round ones (2,000)

Mason et al. (2013): recipients of precise offers counter closer to them. Leib et al. (2022) still found the effect but confirmed only part of the mechanism. A small effect, use it as a minor tip.

CRITICISEDKnowing about anchoring makes you immune

Wilson et al. (1996): warnings, whatever their form or timing, did not remove the anchor. What works is a concrete step: think of reasons for the opposite (Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer, 2000), or focus on your own target, the other side's reservation price and their alternatives (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001).

Part 5

Verdict

Basic anchoring effect
4.5/5
"Meaningless" random numbers
3/5
First-offer advantage
4/5
Value of the lesson
4.5/5
Strengths
  • Simple, easy to redo anywhere
  • Replicated in 36 samples, many countries
  • Applies directly to prices, pay and estimates
Weaknesses
  • The original is a short report with few sample details
  • Purely random numbers pull less than the story says
  • The mechanism is still debated

Robustness 8/10. One of the most robust effects in psychology. Be careful only with "random numbers pull the value of everything" stories.

More: why anchoring stood firm when other effects fell

In psychology's "replication crisis", many famous effects shrank or vanished when redone with large samples. Anchoring is different: in Many Labs, the anchoring questions gave clear results at almost every site.

One likely reason is that the effect is large and easy to measure: all you need is a number and a question. The more surprising versions, like a social security number pulling the price of a bottle of wine, depend a lot on method and are smaller on replication.

The lesson for readers: trust the basic effect, be wary of too-good stories built on it.

Part 6

Applying the lesson

Work skill: salary talks, quotes, budget sign-off. Who names the number first, and how to handle someone else's anchor.

Four steps: prepare your own numbers first, meaning target, floor and alternatives; if you know the market price, go first, ambitious and with reasons; if you do not, ask first and let the other side name a number; if you get anchored, re-anchor with your own number and think of reasons the other number might be wrong. 1 · your numberstarget, flooralternatives 2 · know it: go firstambitiouswith reasons 3 · unsure: ask firstlet them name itdon't guess blindly 4 · anchored: re-anchorrestate your numberdon't haggle around theirs The first number is a right. Use it once you are prepared.
Salary example: look up the market pay range before the talk. If you have it, name a number at the top of the range with two reasons (experience, results). If not, ask "what is the budget range for this role?" before naming a number.
Write your numbers down firstTarget, floor, alternatives. Your own anchor must exist before you hear theirs.
Quotes: lead with the number and the reasonSend a quote with a clear figure and its basis; don't let the client invent one.
Absurd number? Don't counter right awaySay clearly it is not a starting point, then give your own number.
Estimation meetings: write privately firstEveryone notes their number before anyone speaks, so the first speaker doesn't anchor the room.
If the other side opens with an outrageous number, don't answer with an equally outrageous one. Make it clear you will not negotiate around that number.Paraphrase of Daniel Kahneman's advice in Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), chapter on anchors, not a verbatim quote.
Part 7

Read next

Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), chapter 11 "Anchors"The experimenter himself retells the wheel and real-life examples. Volume 3 of the book corner.
Tversky and Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases" (1974)The original paper, short enough for one evening.
Galinsky and Mussweiler, "First offers as anchors" (2001)The basis for "who goes first" advice and for unhooking.
Klein et al., "Investigating variation in replicability" (2014)The Many Labs project; read it to see what a robust effect looks like.
Part 8

Data sources

Every number in this page, the Facebook carousel and the captions comes from the studies below.

Tversky and Kahneman (1974)“Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases”, Science 185(4157), 1124–1131 · Figures used: wheel at 10 and 65, medians 25% and 45%; 5-second multiplication, medians 512 and 2,250, answer 40,320; paying for accuracy did not reduce the effect
Daniel Kahneman (2011)Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, chapter 11 · Figures used: wheel rigged to stop only at 10 or 65; advice on absurd numbers (paraphrase)
Northcraft and Neale (1987)“Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An anchoring-and-adjustment perspective on property pricing decisions”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39(1), 84–97 · Figures used: estate agents pulled by the listing price
Wilson, Houston, Etling and Brekke (1996)“A new look at anchoring effects: Basic anchoring and its antecedents”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 125(4), 387–402 · Figures used: warnings and incentives did not remove anchoring
Mussweiler and Strack (1999)“Hypothesis-consistent testing and semantic priming in the anchoring paradigm: A selective accessibility model”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 35(2), 136–164 · Figures used: selective accessibility model
Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer (2000)“Overcoming the inevitable anchoring effect: Considering the opposite compensates for selective accessibility”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26(9), 1142–1150 · Figures used: considering the opposite reduces anchoring
Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001)“First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81(4), 657–669 · Figures used: 3 experiments; first offerer gains, buyer or seller, face to face and by email; three kinds of focus cancel the advantage
Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003)“Coherent arbitrariness: Stable demand curves without stable preferences”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 73–105 · Figures used: last two digits of a social security number pulled willingness to pay (MBA students)
Englich, Mussweiler and Strack (2006)“Playing dice with criminal sentences: The influence of irrelevant anchors on experts’ judicial decision making”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32(2), 188–200 · Figures used: experienced judges pulled by a number from dice
Epley and Gilovich (2006)“The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient”, Psychological Science 17(4), 311–318 · Figures used: insufficient adjustment from self-generated anchors
Fudenberg, Levine and Maniadis (2012)“On the robustness of anchoring effects in WTP and WTA experiments”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4(2), 131–145 · Figures used: lab replication: very weak anchoring for goods, none for lotteries
Mason, Lee, Wiley and Ames (2013)“Precise offers are potent anchors: Conciliatory counteroffers and attributions of knowledge in negotiations”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49(4), 759–763 · Figures used: precise offers (e.g. 1,865 vs 2,000) get closer counteroffers
Klein et al. (2014)“Investigating variation in replicability: A ‘Many Labs’ replication project”, Social Psychology 45(3), 142–152 · Figures used: 13 effects, 36 samples, 6,344 people, 10 effects replicated; four anchoring questions
Maniadis, Tufano and List (2014)“One swallow doesn’t make a summer: New evidence on anchoring effects”, American Economic Review 104(1), 277–290 · Figures used: replication of Ariely et al.'s unpleasant-sounds experiment, weaker and non-significant effect
Li, Maniadis and Sedikides (2021)“Anchoring in economics: A meta-analysis of studies on willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept”, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 90 · Figures used: 53 studies; moderate effect, smaller than early studies; non-random anchors pull harder
Leib, Kee, Loschelder and Roskes (2022)“Perspective taking does not moderate the price precision effect, but indirectly affects counteroffers to asking prices”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 101, 104323 · Figures used: precision effect found again, only part of the mechanism confirmed
Petrowsky et al. (2025)“The power and peril of first offers in negotiations: A conceptual, meta-analytic, and experimental synthesis”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 191, 104448 · Figures used: 90 studies, 16,334 people; first offer and final price r = 0.62; ambitious offers mean fewer deals and less satisfied recipients; 2 experiments, 2,121 people; effects shrink with more issues
Harvard Program on Negotiation (PON)article “When to make the first offer in negotiations”, pon.harvard.edu · Figures used: no figures; rule of thumb "go first if you know the market, let them go first if you don't"