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Mark ở vũ trụ khác · Another Universe Big Events Revisited #6 · Economy · Central banking

The Great Depression

The United States and the world · from August 1929 to the late 1930s

Whatthe longest and deepest downturn of the modern industrial economy
Scale (US)unemployment about 25% in 1933, about 9,000 banks suspended
Paradoxthe first shock was not the worst part; the response made it "Great"
Main sourcesFederal Reserve History, FDIC, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke (2002)

Source: Federal Reserve History, "The Great Depression" (Richardson); Richmond Fed Economic Brief 12-11 (unemployment 25.2%); FDIC, "A Brief History of Deposit Insurance" (about 9,000 banks, from autumn 1929 to the end of 1933). The original pages were blocked in the working environment, so they were checked through search-result excerpts.

The 1-minute recap

Essence

It began before the crashThe downturn began in August 1929. The stock market crashed in October 1929, afterwards.
Banks fell like dominoesAbout 9,000 banks suspended from autumn 1929 to the end of 1933.
Money shrankThe money supply fell nearly 30% from autumn 1930 to winter 1933. The Fed calls it its gravest error.
A quarter without workUnemployment rose from 3.3% (1929) to about 25% (1933).
It left new rulesDeposit insurance (1934), the SEC (1934), Social Security (1935).

Source: Federal Reserve History, "The Great Depression" (start in August 1929; money supply nearly 30%); FDIC (about 9,000 banks; insurance from 1 Jan 1934); Richmond Fed Economic Brief 12-11 (3.3% and 25.2%); SEC Historical Society (SEC, 1934); SSA (Social Security Act, 14 Aug 1935). Via search-result excerpts.

Part 1

The question of the event

Why did a stock market fall and an ordinary recession stretch into a decade of hardship? Because how the world responded in the first three years mattered more than the first shock.

The answer is Mark's reading, based on Federal Reserve History and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Economists still debate the causes: see Part 3 and Part 5.

1929The shockDownturn begins in August, stocks crash in October.
→
1930–1933The spiralBanks fail, money shrinks, prices fall, debts grow heavier, more banks fail.
→
1933–1939New rulesBanks closed, gold abandoned, deposits insured. Recovery, then a relapse in 1937.
Part 2

Timeline

Ten years, three banking panics, one relapse. Dates from Federal Reserve History and the FDIC.

Timeline 1929 to 1938. August 1929 the downturn begins. 28 October 1929 stocks fall nearly 13% in one day. Late 1930 the first banking panic; 11 December 1930 the Bank of United States closes. 21 September 1931 Britain leaves gold; in October the Fed raises rates. 8 July 1932 stocks hit bottom. March 1933 a national bank holiday. 1 January 1934 deposit insurance. 1936 to 1937 reserve requirements doubled; 1937 to 1938 a new recession. 19291930193119321933193419361938 Aug 1929downturn begins 28 Oct 1929stocks −13% Dec 1930banking panic Sep–Oct 1931 · Britain leaves gold, Fed raises rates 8 Jul 1932 · stock market bottom Mar 1933bank holiday 1 Jan 1934deposit insurance 1937–38relapse
Three years of falling, then new rules. Brown: the contraction years. Lime: recovery after 1933. Last segment: the 1937–38 recession.Source: Federal Reserve History (start Aug 1929; −13% on 28 Oct 1929; bottom 8 Jul 1932; Bank of United States 11 Dec 1930; Britain leaves gold 21 Sep 1931; bank holiday Mar 1933; reserve requirements 1936–37); FDIC (insurance from 1 Jan 1934). Via search-result excerpts.
1929 compared with the bottom. Dow Jones: 381.17 at the peak on 3 Sep 1929, 41.22 at the bottom on 8 Jul 1932, down about 89 percent. Unemployment: 3.3 percent in 1929, 25.2 percent in 1933. Real GDP in 1933 about 26.5 percent below 1929. Dow Jones (points) 381.17 41.22 · bottom 8 Jul 1932 · −89% Unemployment 3.3% (1929) 25.2% Real GDP (1929 = 100) 100 about 73.5 (1933) top bar: 1929 · bottom bar: the low; each group has its own scale
Nearly nine tenths of stock values, a quarter of output, a quarter of workers without a job. Unemployment has two series: 25.2% (Statistical History) and 24.9% (Lebergott); Darby's series is a few points lower because it counts people on work relief as employed.Source: Federal Reserve History, "Stock Market Crash of 1929" (381.17 and 41.22; −89% is Mark's calculation); Richmond Fed Economic Brief 12-11 (3.3% and 25.2%); Margo (1993), Journal of Economic Perspectives (Lebergott and Darby); real GDP from BEA figures in the Saylor textbook, table 7.1 ($865.2 and $635.5 billion in 2000 dollars; secondary source; −26.5% is Mark's calculation).
August 1929 · The downturn beginsThe 1920s boom ends. The Fed had worried about speculation: the New York discount rate reached 6% in August 1929.
3 Sep 1929 · Stock market peakThe Dow Jones closes at 381.17.
24 and 28–29 Oct 1929 · The crashPanic selling on Thursday 24 October; on 28 October the Dow falls nearly 13%. The New York Fed buys bonds, lends quickly, cuts its rate.
Late 1930 · First banking panic1,350 banks suspended during 1930. On 11 December 1930 the Bank of United States, New York City's fourth-largest bank, closes.
Apr–Aug 1931 · Second waveDeposits withdrawn, people hold more cash.
21 Sep 1931 · Britain leaves goldGold flows out of the US. In early October the New York Fed raises its discount rate from 1.5% to 3.5%.
Apr–Aug 1932 · Pump, then stopThe Fed buys about $1 billion of bonds, then stops in the summer.
8 Jul 1932 · Stock market bottomThe Dow Jones is down to 41.22.
March 1933 · Every bank closedAbout a week from 6 March. The Emergency Banking Act, introduced on 9 March: only sound banks may reopen. In 1933 some 4,000 banks closed.
Apr 1933–Jan 1934 · Off goldExecutive Order 6102 (5 Apr 1933) requires gold to be handed in at $20.67 an ounce. The Gold Reserve Act (30 Jan 1934) leads to a gold price of $35 an ounce.
16 Jun 1933 and 1 Jan 1934 · Deposit insuranceThe Banking Act of 1933 creates the FDIC. Insurance starts on 1 January 1934, up to $2,500 per depositor. In 1934 only 9 insured banks failed.
1936–1938 · RelapseThe Fed doubles reserve requirements. Recession again in 1937–38; unemployment rises from 14.3% to 19.0%.

Source: Federal Reserve History: "The Great Depression", "Stock Market Crash of 1929" (6%, 381.17, −13%, New York Fed response, 41.22), "Banking Panics of 1930–31" (11 Dec 1930), "Banking Panics of 1931–33" (21 Sep 1931, rate rise in early October 1931), "Bank Holiday of 1933", "Emergency Banking Act of 1933" (9 Mar 1933), "Recession of 1937–38"; FDIC (1,350 banks in 1930 from a Federal Reserve History essay cited with FDIC material; about 4,000 in 1933; $2,500; 9 failures in 1934); Marriner Eccles memo on FRASER (1.5% to 3.5%); Hsieh and Romer (2006), Journal of Economic History (about $1 billion in 1932); 24 Oct 1929 from History.com (secondary source); Executive Order 6102 and the Gold Reserve Act from Wikipedia and EBSCO (secondary sources); Banking Act of 16 Jun 1933 from Wikipedia and EBSCO (secondary sources); 1937–38 unemployment from Wikipedia (secondary source, series not stated).

Part 1 of 3

Timeline

Aug 1929−89%9,000 banks25%
Part 2 of 3

Key decisions

Fed 1929letting banks faildefending gold 1931role-play
Part 3 of 3

What the world learned

FDIClender of last resortcut the spiral
Part 3

Key decisions

Five decisions, seen with the eyes of the time: who decided, what they knew, what they chose, what happened next. Many choices followed the "rules of the game" of that era.

The 1930 to 1933 spiral: banks fail, people withdraw and hoard cash, money and credit shrink, prices fall, real debts grow heavier, firms and farms default, more banks fail. Places to cut the loop: emergency lending to banks, deposit insurance, easier money. banks fail cash withdrawn credit shrinks prices fall debts feel heavier defaults cut the loop: emergency lending, deposit insurance, easier money Diagram of the mechanism, after Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Bernanke (1983). No figures.
Each turn makes the next one stronger. The decisions below were moments when the loop could have been cut, or not.Source: mechanism from Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States (1963) and Bernanke (1983), American Economic Review (via secondary summaries). The diagram is Mark's illustration.

1 · After the crash, October 1929: pump in money

New York Fed · George Harrison

What they knew

Stocks fell nearly 13% on 28 October. New York banks were carrying loans to stock market players.

What they chose

Buy government bonds, speed up discount-window lending, cut the rate, promise all the reserves banks needed.

What happened

The banking system got through the stock market shock. This response is judged a good one.

Source: Federal Reserve History, "Stock Market Crash of 1929" (via search-result excerpts).

2 · The 1930 banking panic: let the market sort it out

Reserve banks, Federal Reserve Board

What they knew

In late 1930 banks failed in droves; 1,350 suspended over the year. Many small banks were not Fed members. A common belief then: weak banks failing "cleans out" the system.

What they chose

No broad emergency lending. For the Bank of United States, the New York Fed and big banks tried a merger; talks broke down and the bank closed on 11 December 1930.

What happened

The news spread nationwide and people withdrew money. Friedman and Schwartz saw the 1930 panic as a major factor turning an ordinary recession into the Great Depression. Some scholars think that bank was already insolvent.

Source: Federal Reserve History, "Banking Panics of 1930–31"; FDIC history page 1930–1939 (merger attempt, debate over solvency); Friedman and Schwartz (1963), via secondary summaries.

3 · Britain leaves gold, October 1931: raise rates to keep gold

New York Fed · gold standard

What they knew

On 21 September 1931 Britain left the gold standard. Gold flowed out of the US. By the central-banking "book" of the time, you stop a gold drain with high rates.

What they chose

In early October (9 October per the FDIC), raise the discount rate from 1.5% to 3.5%.

What happened

Gold was kept, but money was tightened while banks were failing. A new panic ran on into 1933.

Source: Federal Reserve History, "Banking Panics of 1931–33"; FDIC history page 1930–1939 (9 Oct 1931); Marriner Eccles memo on FRASER (1.5% to 3.5%).

4 · March 1933: close to reopen, then leave gold

President Roosevelt, Congress, Treasury, Fed

What they knew

A new panic spread across the country in early 1933; many states had already closed their banks.

What they chose

Close every bank for about a week from 6 March; the Emergency Banking Act (9 March) let only sound banks reopen. April 1933 gold must be handed in; January 1934 gold goes to $35 an ounce.

What happened

The banking spiral stopped. In 1934, the first year of deposit insurance, only 9 insured banks failed.

Source: Federal Reserve History, "Bank Holiday of 1933" and "Emergency Banking Act of 1933"; FDIC (9 failures in 1934); Executive Order 6102 and the Gold Reserve Act from Wikipedia and EBSCO (secondary sources).

5 · 1936–37: support withdrawn too early?

Federal Reserve Board · reserve requirements

What they knew

Banks' excess reserves rose from $859 million (December 1933) to over $3.3 billion (December 1935). The Fed feared an "injurious credit expansion".

What they chose

Double reserve requirement ratios, in several steps in 1936–37.

What happened

Recession again in 1937–38. Whether this caused it is still debated: Friedman and Schwartz say yes; Calomiris, Mason and Wheelock say the effect was small.

Source: Federal Reserve History, "Recession of 1937–38"; Calomiris, Mason and Wheelock, NBER Working Paper 16688.

What do economists still debate about the causes?

Money (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963): banking panics and the Fed letting the money stock shrink by about a third (1929–1933) were the main cause.

Spending (Temin, 1976): spending fell first; the 1930 panic was not a major deflationary shock.

The gold standard (Eichengreen, 1992; Temin, 1989): the rules of gold tied central banks' hands worldwide and carried the shock across borders.

The credit channel (Bernanke, 1983): collapsing banks cut the lending channel; falling prices made debts heavier.

Hsieh and Romer (2006) found that the $1 billion of purchases in 1932 led almost no one to expect a dollar devaluation, meaning gold did not bind the Fed as tightly as often thought, at least that year. A 1995 survey of economic historians (Whaples) showed they still disagree a lot about the causes. The closest thing to a consensus: an ordinary downturn made much worse by the Fed, the gold standard and the collapse of banking. There is no single settled answer.

Source: Friedman and Schwartz (1963); Temin (1976, 1989); Eichengreen (1992); Bernanke (1983); Hsieh and Romer (2006), Journal of Economic History 66(1); Whaples (1995), Journal of Economic History 55(1). Via summaries and excerpts; "a third" is Friedman and Schwartz's figure as quoted in secondary summaries.

Part 4

What the world learned

Things we take for granted today were born in this decade.

Bank failures: an average of 2,277 a year in 1930 to 1933, about 4,000 in 1933 alone. In 1934, the first year of deposit insurance, only 9 insured banks failed. 2,277/yearaverage 1930–1933 about 4,000in 1933 9in 1934 (insured)
Deposit insurance ended the queues to withdraw cash. Once depositors knew their money was guaranteed, there was no reason to run before everyone else.Source: FDIC, "A Brief History of Deposit Insurance" and FDIC retrospectives (2,277 a year, about 4,000 in 1933, 9 failures in 1934; insurance up to $2,500 from 1 Jan 1934). Via search-result excerpts.
Deposit insuranceThe Banking Act of 16 June 1933 created the FDIC; coverage ran from 1 January 1934.
Lender of last resortThe central-bank lesson: in a panic, lend freely instead of letting the system sort itself out.
Securities oversightThe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC.
A safety netThe Social Security Act was signed on 14 August 1935.
Don't let gold tie your handsCountries that left gold early tended to recover sooner (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985).
Don't withdraw support too earlyThe 1937–38 lesson, even though its cause is still debated.

Source: FDIC; SEC Historical Society (SEC 1934); SSA history pages (14 Aug 1935); Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Journal of Economic History 45(4); Federal Reserve History, "Recession of 1937–38". 16 Jun 1933 from Wikipedia and EBSCO (secondary sources).

Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, to Milton Friedman on 8 November 2002 at the University of Chicago (FRASER; Richmond Fed Econ Focus). A personal remark, not an official Fed statement. For 2008, see the Lehman Brothers piece in the Business Failures series.
Part 5

Fact check: what's true and what's myth

14 things often said about the Great Depression, checked against the Fed, FDIC, CDC and peer-reviewed research. Tap each line for the reason.

Suicides in Manhattan in the four weeks after the 1929 crash: 44, fewer than the 53 in the same period of 1928. But the US suicide rate rose from 18.0 per 100,000 people in 1928 to 22.1 in 1932. Manhattan, 4 weeks after the crash (cases) same period 192853 after the 1929 crash44 Whole US, rate per 100,000 people 192818.0 193222.1 (record high)
No "wave of jumpers" right after the crash. The real pain came more slowly. The suicide rate rose with the long years of unemployment.Source: New York chief medical examiner Charles Norris, November 1929, via History.com (secondary source); CDC press release of 14 Apr 2011 on Luo et al., American Journal of Public Health 101(6) (2011).
SOLIDStocks lost nearly 90% from the 1929 peak to the 1932 bottom

Dow Jones 381.17 (3 Sep 1929) down to 41.22 (8 Jul 1932), a fall of 89% (Mark's calculation). Federal Reserve History, "Stock Market Crash of 1929".

SOLIDAbout 9,000 banks suspended

FDIC: from autumn 1929 to the end of 1933, depositors lost about $1.3 billion. Another FDIC publication counts "more than 9,000" up to the March 1933 bank holiday. State the time window when quoting it.

SOLIDThe Fed let the money supply shrink sharply

Federal Reserve History: nearly 30% from autumn 1930 to winter 1933, the Fed's most serious "sin of omission". Friedman and Schwartz: about a third, 1929–1933 (different window).

SOLIDThe suicide rate rose during the Depression

CDC (2011), Luo et al.: 18.0 (1928) up to 22.1 per 100,000 (1932), the highest ever recorded. The biggest rise was among working-age adults.

SOLIDCountries that left gold early recovered sooner

Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Journal of Economic History: early devaluers had better industrial output and exports. Note: a single country's devaluation hurt its neighbours.

CAUTION"The Fed alone caused the Great Depression"

The Fed made big mistakes (Federal Reserve History says so itself), but there was also the gold standard (Eichengreen), a fall in spending (Temin), and the collapse of the credit channel (Bernanke 1983). No single settled answer (Whaples 1995).

CAUTION"The Fed officially apologised"

The 2002 apology was a remark by Ben Bernanke, then one governor, at a celebration for Milton Friedman. Not a Fed resolution. The Fed's own Federal Reserve History site does say the Fed made errors.

CAUTION"The Smoot-Hawley tariff caused the Great Depression"

The law came in 1930, after the downturn had begun; 1,028 economists signed a letter against it beforehand (5 May 1930, secondary source). Eichengreen (1986): small direct macro effect. Irwin (2011): it harmed world trade. A contributor, not the main cause.

CAUTION"Treasury Secretary Mellon advised liquidating everything"

The line "liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers" appears only in Hoover's memoirs (1951), with no independent source. Hoover presented it as the view of a camp he did not side with (secondary source).

CAUTION"The New Deal prolonged the Depression"

Whaples survey (1995): about half of economists and 27% of historians agreed wholly or partly (via secondary sources). Researchers are split.

CAUTION"Doubling reserve requirements caused the 1937–38 recession"

Friedman and Schwartz say yes. Calomiris, Mason and Wheelock (NBER) find the requirements did not bind banks, so the effect was small. Federal Reserve History gives both views.

FALSE"The day of the stock market crash caused the Great Depression"

The downturn began in August 1929, before the crash. The crash was a big shock, but the worst damage came later: three banking panics in 1930–1933 and policy decisions (Federal Reserve History; Friedman and Schwartz).

FALSE"Investors jumped out of windows en masse"

Manhattan: 44 suicides in the 4 weeks after the crash, fewer than 53 in the same period of 1928 (Norris, via History.com, secondary source). Galbraith called it a legend. There were a few real individual cases.

FALSE"It was America's problem alone"

Federal Reserve History describes a series of national and international financial crises in 1931–1933. Britain left gold in September 1931; the shock travelled through the gold standard system (Eichengreen).

Source: as noted in each line; full list in Part 9.

Part 6

Verdict: how the world responded

Scores are Mark's assessment based on the sources in Part 9, not data from a study.

Early detection
2/5
Central bank 1930–32
1/5
International coordination
1/5
Fixing it once seen (1933)
4/5
Long-term learning
5/5
Got right
  • The New York Fed pumped in money right after the 1929 crash
  • Close, inspect, then reopen the banks (1933)
  • Deposit insurance, the SEC, Social Security
Got wrong
  • Let banks fail in a chain through 1930–1933
  • Raised rates to keep gold in the middle of a panic (1931)
  • Pumped in 1932 then stopped; tightened again in 1936–37

The 1929 shock was not the worst of it. The worst was three years of letting the spiral run, in the belief that the system would clean itself and the gold rule had to be kept at any cost.

More: being fair to people at the time

In 1930 there was no theory of a lender of last resort for a system of thousands of small banks, no monthly unemployment data, and keeping gold was seen as duty. Raising rates in 1931 was by the book of the time.

But not everyone thought so: the New York Fed pumped in money in 1929 and wanted to do more; in 1932 the Fed did pump, then stopped on its own. Other choices were on the table, just not chosen.

Mark's commentary, based on Federal Reserve History and Hsieh and Romer (2006).

Part 7

Work lesson: how you respond matters more than the first shock

For any team facing a problem that is spreading: customers leaving, projects slipping in a chain, rumours inside the company.

Four habits: cut the spiral first, find fault later; ask what goal a rule serves; don't withdraw support before the numbers are stable; say clearly what is guaranteed so people stop running. 1 · cut the loop firststop the spreadfind fault later 2 · what is the rule forthe team's old rulestill serving the goal? 3 · don't pull out earlyexit by numberslesson of 1932, 1937 4 · say what's guaranteeddeposit insuranceso people stop running The shock is hard to avoid. The spiral after it is not.
Each habit patches one failure of 1930–1937. Letting banks fail "to clean up", keeping gold at any cost, stopping the 1932 pump, tightening again in 1936–37, and depositors running because they did not know whether their money was safe.Source: the failures are from Part 2 and Part 3; the habits are Mark's suggestions.
Cut the loop first, find fault laterWhile a problem is spreading, the first job is to stop it: more people, more money, call the customers. The "who was wrong" meeting can wait a week.
What is this rule for?Every hard rule ("we never discount", "nobody skips a level") must answer: which goal does it protect, and does it still protect it now?
Withdraw support by numbers, not by calendarWrite it down in advance: which metric must stay stable for how long before you pull people or budget away from what you just rescued.
Say clearly what is guaranteedIn a crisis people run because they are unsure. One clear sentence ("this month's salaries are paid in full", "orders already placed will ship") stops many runs.
Check your own team: 5 questions

1. At your last incident, how long did the team take from noticing to stopping the spread? What was most of that time spent on?

2. Does the team have a "gold standard": a rule nobody dares break even while it does harm?

3. Who is allowed to add people or money within 24 hours without waiting for a meeting?

4. The last time the team withdrew support from something it had just rescued, which number did it rely on?

5. If customers or colleagues are worried, what guarantee can the team state today?

Part 8

Further reading

Federal Reserve History, essays on the Great DepressionThe Fed's own short essays: the 1929 crash, the banking panics of 1930–31 and 1931–33, the 1933 bank holiday, the 1937–38 recession.
Ben Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression (2000)Research on the credit channel and the gold standard by the later Fed Chair.
Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters (1992)Why the gold standard spread the shock around the world.
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States (1963), chapter 7"The Great Contraction", the classic monetary argument.
Big Events Revisited #07: The ozone hole (1974–1987)Act when the evidence is strong enough; don't wait for 100% certainty.
Part 9

Sources

Fed, FDIC, CDC and SSA documents and peer-reviewed research first. The working environment blocked the original sites, so these were checked through excerpts of those very pages in search results, without opening the full text. Secondary sources are marked.

  1. Federal Reserve History (Gary Richardson and co-authors): "The Great Depression"; "Stock Market Crash of 1929"; "Banking Panics of 1930–31"; "Banking Panics of 1931–33"; "Bank Holiday of 1933"; "Emergency Banking Act of 1933"; "Recession of 1937–38". federalreservehistory.org
  2. FDIC, "A Brief History of Deposit Insurance"; "The First Fifty Years"; history page 1930–1939. fdic.gov
  3. Ben S. Bernanke, "On Milton Friedman's Ninetieth Birthday", University of Chicago, 8 Nov 2002. federalreserve.gov · FRASER
  4. Marriner Eccles, memo on 1931 rates, FRASER. fraser.stlouisfed.org
  5. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Brief EB 12-11 (2012), unemployment 1929–1933. richmondfed.org
  6. CDC, press release 14 Apr 2011; Luo F. et al. (2011), American Journal of Public Health 101(6):1139–1146. cdc.gov
  7. SSA, Social Security history pages (14 Aug 1935). ssa.gov · SEC Historical Society, timeline (SEC 1934).
  8. Peer-reviewed research: Friedman and Schwartz (1963), A Monetary History of the United States; Bernanke (1983), American Economic Review 73(3); Temin (1976); Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Journal of Economic History 45(4); Eichengreen (1992), Golden Fetters; Hsieh and Romer (2006), Journal of Economic History 66(1); Whaples (1995), Journal of Economic History 55(1); Margo (1993), Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(2); Calomiris, Mason and Wheelock, NBER Working Paper 16688.
  9. Secondary sources: Saylor textbook Macroeconomics: Theory Through Applications (real GDP from BEA); History.com (Norris, 44 and 53 cases; 24 Oct 1929); J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929 (1955); Wikipedia and EBSCO (Executive Order 6102, Gold Reserve Act, Banking Act of 1933, 1937–38 unemployment); Mercatus and FEE (letter of 1,028 economists); Irwin, Peddling Protectionism (2011); Selgin and economics blogs (the Mellon line); Independent Institute, Marginal Revolution (Whaples); VoxEU (timing of the 1932 purchases).